Abstract. In previous RFID protocols, a hash-chain is used to achieve good privacy. Each tag is associated with a chain of Q hash values. To identify one tag out of a total of N tags, a server searches a table of size N Q. A naive search takes either Θ(N Q) time or Θ(N Q) memory, and therefore it does not scale well. A time-space tradeoff technique can mitigate the scalability problem. However, with the time-memory tradeoff, either time or space is still at least Θ((N Q) 2/3 ). In this paper, we propose a novel RFID protocol to solve the scalability problem. The server "solves", instead of "searches", for a tag ID. The protocol is based on polynomial operations, and its security and privacy is based on the difficulty of reconstructing a polynomial with noisy data. The protocol supports very large values of the product N Q. In our demo implementation where N = 2 32 and Q = 13700, the server takes 0.1 seconds and 10K bytes memory to identify a tag. As a comparison, a hash-chain based protocol enhanced with a time-memory tradeoff will require about 67 seconds and a 1G bytes memory.
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automated object identification technology. RFID systems consist of two main components: tags and readers. Tags are small radio transponders. They contain the identification information of objects to which they are attached. Readers query these tags for the identifying information about the objects. Readers often have secure access to a back-end database. For simplicity, a reader and a back-end database can be treated as a single entity.
While being promising in a wide range of applications such as supply chain, anti-counterfeiting, and libraries, RFID also raises privacy and security concerns. Since RFID tags respond to radio interrogation automatically, malicious scanning of tags is a plausible threat. Even if the information emitted by a tag is encrypted, the information may be used to track the tag, thus causing privacy issues. An equally significant problem is authentication. One purpose of RFID research supported by NSERC discovery grant tags is to prove the authenticity of objects. If an RFID tag can be scanned and replicated, then a counterfeit tag can be made to impersonate the authentic one.
RFID protocols must provide privacy and security under those possible attacks. A common attack model is as follows. There is an adversary who is able to eavesdrop the communications between the tags and readers, interrogate the tags, and compromise some tags. The goal of the adversary is to impersonate or track uncompromised tags. Correspondingly, an RFID protocol needs to meet two requirements: be secure against impersonation and be untraceable.
In addition to the security and privacy requirements, an RFID protocol needs to be scalable on the reader side and efficient on the tag side. An RFID system may have a large number, say, millions to billions, of tags. The RFID protocol must be scalable to allow the reader to deal with such a large number of tags. On the other hand, a tag has very limited resources in computation and memory, so the protocol must be efficient on the tag side. For cryptographic tools, symmetric key techniques are usually considered feasible for some RFID tags while public key techniques are considered unsuitable for any of them.
To design an RFID protocol satisfying all the desired privacy, security, scalability, and efficiency properties is challenging. Privacy makes RFID authentication different from conventional cryptographic authentication. Using symmetric key techniques, secure authentication relies on a symmetric key shared between a tag and reader. For privacy, a tag cannot identify itself to a reader before an authentication interaction, thus the reader does not know which key to use in the interaction. A straightforward solution is to try every key. This is prohibitively costly when the number of tags becomes large. This is known as the key search problem. Literature in this area has sought to reduce the cost of key search. Every such protocol proposed so far involves some kind of tradeoff among the desired properties [13] .
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose a novel RFID protocol to solve the key search problem. The server "solves", instead of "searches", for a tag ID in an identification process. The operation is based on polynomial computations and its security and privacy is based on the difficulty of reconstructing polynomials with noisy data. The protocol supports a very large number of tags as well as a very large number of queries on one tag, which is impractical for previous protocols. At the same time, the protocol is secure and privacy-preserving.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review RFID protocols addressing the scalability issue. In Section 3, we present our scheme. Section 4 gives the security analysis. Section 5 gives the performance analysis, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Work
In this section, we review previous approaches and solutions to the key search problem in the literature. In [13] , Juels gave a comprehensive survey of RFID security and privacy, including the key search problem. Here we briefly review the existing solutions.
Tree approach. In [16] , Molnar and Wagner proposed a scheme to reduce the key search cost to Θ(log n) where n is the total number of keys. The scheme uses d sets of keys K 1 , . . . , K d . Each set contains b keys. Each tag is assigned with d
The key assignment can be represented as a tree of depth d and each node has d children. The scheme can accommodate up to b d tags in total. In an identification session, the tag runs d rounds of interaction with the reader. In the i th round, the tag uses the key k i , and the reader searches K i . In a session, the reader needs to search through db keys.
Since a key will be used in more than one tag, compromise of one tag results in compromise of keys in other tags; hence this leads to privacy infringements [2] .
Synchronization approach. The basic idea in the synchronization approach is for the reader and tags to maintain a synchronized state. For example, every tag T i maintains a counter c i . On interrogation, the tag outputs E = f k i (c i ) where f is a keyed hash function and k i is a secret key shared between the reader and T i , then increases c i . The reader can compute all possible outputs of all tags and store the results in a searchable table. In each interrogation, the reader searches the response from the tag in the table.
There are several variants of the above approach in the literature, e.g., Ohkubo, Suzuki, and Kinoshita [19] , Henrici and Müller [11] , Juels [12] , and Dimitriou [8] .
Time-space tradeoff approach. In [3] and [2] , Avoine, Dysli, and Oechslin used a time-space trade-off to achieve Θ(n 2 3 ) in both memory and time complexity for key search. Time-space tradeoff is used as an enhancement to the synchronization approach. The basic idea is to organize all future response values of all tags in chains. Each chain consists of a sequence of response values as follows. The reader chooses a random function f to map a response value x to a pair (i, j), then the response of tag i at the j th query will be the successor of x in the chain. Only the head and the tail of a chain is stored. When receiving a response x, the reader can apply f to get its successors. The reader searches x and its successors in all the tails of the chains to locate the chain which contains x. Then it starts from the head of the chain, applies f repeatedly, and locates (i, j) of x.
Scheme Description
In this section, we present our RFID protocol. We assume that there are N tags and one reader (here the reader refers to an entity consisting of the actual reader, the database that stores the tag information, and perhaps an application server which processes the data). We also assume that a tag is capable of generating random bits, computing cryptographic hash functions, and modular multiplication over a field F 2 l . Such tags would fall into the category of symmetric-key tags in [13] .
Initial Setup
The initial setup configures the reader and the tags as follows.
-Choose an l-bit block cipher and a secret key. Let E be the encryption function and D be the decryption function. -Generate m random bivariate polynomials f 1 (x, y), . . . , f m (x, y) over a finite field F 2 l . The degree of x and y in each f i is at most k. -Assign the m polynomials to the reader.
in the tag in a randomly permuted order.
• Set a counter c to 0.
• Set an interrogation threshold Q max , which is the maximum number of queries that the tag will answer correctly.
• Set a number b, which will be used in the protocol.
-Choose a secure hash function h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l which will be used by readers and tags.
Note that the meta ID x i is not stored in the tag or the reader. We will discuss the parameter selection for l, m, b, k, and Q max in the analysis and performance sections.
Authentication
The authentication process between a reader and a tag i is as follows.
1. The reader generates r ∈ F 2 l uniformly at random, then sends r to the tag. 2. If c > Q max , then the tag responds with b random points in
Otherwise, the tag does the following: (a) Generate r ∈ F 2 l uniformly at random, and compute y = h(r||r ). Remark. In Step 2 (b), to pick a polynomial, the tag can use two different approaches. One is random choice and the other is random permutation. In random choice, each time, the tag chooses one polynomial from the m polynomials uniformly at random. In random permutation, the choice of g in m consecutive authentication sessions is a random permutation of the m polynomials assigned to the tag. In the following parts, we assume the random permutation approach.
Correctness If the reader receives b points from a valid tag with ID i, then one of the points (r , z ) will
At the reader side, E(i) will be the solution of x to the equation z = f j (x, h(r||r )). So the valid tag will be correctly identified. The server will also get up to mbk − 1 other solutions in one authentication session. The distribution of the meta IDs can be considered to be uniformly at random in F 2 l , so the probability that one or more of these solutions happen to be valid meta IDs is estimated to be
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy properties of our protocol.
Recall that in the attack model, the adversary can eavesdrop and query any tag, and it can compromise some tags. The goal of the adversary is to impersonate or trace the uncompromised tags.
Query and Recovery
First, we consider the query-and-recovery attack. In this attack, the adversary repeatedly queries a tag, collects the responses, and then tries to recover the polynomials assigned to the tag. This is an intermediate step toward impersonation and tracing. Our security analysis for the query-and-recover attack is based on the hardness of the noisy polynomial interpolation problem, which is related to the wellknown polynomial reconstruction problem. Next we present existing results about these problems in the literature, followed by our analysis.
Preliminary First we review the polynomial reconstruction (PR) problem [15] and the noisy polynomial interpolation (NPI) problem [18] .
Definition 1. (Polynomial reconstruction)
Input: Integers k and t, and T points {(
The best known algorithm to solve this problem is the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm [10] . It solves the problem when t > √ T k in time polynomial in T . When t ≤ √ T k, the current state of knowledge suggests that the problem may be difficult even in the light of recent extensions of list or average case decoding for related families of codes [15] .
A variant of the PR problem, denoted as the noisy polynomial interpolation (NPI) problem, is as follows:
Input: S sets of points generated as follows: Pick a random polynomial P over F 2 l of degree at most k. Generate S ≥ k + 1 sets, each containing B points. The x coordinate of each point is randomly chosen from F 2 l subject to the condition that all x values are distinct and different from 0. In each set there is exactly one point (x, y) which satisfies y = P (x). For the other B −1 points, the y coordinate is chosen randomly.
Output: the polynomial P .
The NPI problem is presented in [18] . A previous version of this problem was presented in [17] in which the points in the same set all have the same x coordinate. In [5] , Bleichenbacher and Nguyen show that having the same x coordinate allows meet-in-the-middle attacks and lattice attacks. However, it is unknown how to employ these attacks against NPI. It appears that, although there is more information given in NPI than in the PR problem, NPI may be as hard as the PR problem.
Parameter Selection for NPI In [18] , Noar and Pinkas also proposed a cryptographic assumption based on the NPI problem. They assumed that, if S, B and k are polynomial in the security parameter and S < √ SBk, then the problem is hard. Here we further analyze the security level under concrete parameter settings.
First we review the analysis of parameter choices for the PR problem in [14] . In [14] , the best approach to solve the PR problem is assumed to be one of the two choices: (1) choose k + 1 points to recover a polynomial and then test all T k+1 polynomials, or (2) delete d points, where t > (T − d)k, and use the GS algorithm on the remaining T − d points. We call the first approach exhaustive search; its idea is clear. The idea of the second approach is to delete d points. If all the d points are not on the polynomial P , then it happens that t > (T − d)k so that GS will output the proper P . We call this approach exhaustive deletion.
We note that the idea of exhaustive search and exhaustive deletion can be generalized to selecting n points where k + 1 ≤ n ≤ T . We use this generalized idea for the NPI problem and consider the following new probabilistic algorithm A as shown in Algorithm 1 to solve NPI.
Note that A may output more than one polynomial. If P is among them, we consider A successful in solving the problem.
Let P N P I (S, B, k, n, β) be the probability that P will be outputted. Let t be the number of points in the set of nβ points that satisfy y = P (x). It is clear Algorithm 1: A choose n sets of points choose β points from each set use the nβ points as input to the GS algorithm, and output all polynomials of degree at most k that fit at least k + 1 points.
that 0 ≤ t ≤ n and t follows a binomial distribution with parameters (
√ nβk, then P will be outputted. It holds that
Remark. Note that, when β = 1 and n = k + 1, the algorithm becomes an exhaustive search and
.
When β = B, the algorithm is deterministic for given n. In this situation, if n ≤ Bk, then √ nBk + 1 > n so that P N P I (S, B, k, n, B) = 0. If n > Bk, then
Regarding the hardness of NPI, we make the following assumption to estimate the concrete security level.
Assumption 1 Let
Let n 0 , β 0 be the optimal choices of n, β for A to achieve Adv 
(See Appendix A for a detailed analysis).
Security Under Query-and-Recovery Now we relate the difficulty of the query-and-recover attack to the difficulty of solving the NPI problem.
Recall that in the protocol, to answer a challenge r, the tag computes z = g(h(r||r )) where r is a random number generated by the tag. h(r||r ) can be considered as random to the adversary. This point (z , r ) is sent along with other b − 1 random points. In a query-and-recovery attack, the adversary queries a tag Q times. In every consecutive m queries, the tag uses each of its m polynomials once and in a random order. The problem for the adversary is to recover these polynomials after Q queries. We have the following result. Given , m, b, and k, there is a Q max such that for Q ≤ Q max , it holds that
Q/m,mb−m+1,k ≤ . Therefore, Q max is the maximum number of queries allowed for one tag. Q max can be estimated as
(See Appendix B for a detailed analysis). Equation (6) indicates that Q max increases linearly with m 2 and k. mk indicates the memory overhead to store the m polynomials of degree k in a tag. Q max also increases linearly with b, which indicates the communication overhead and the number of random points the tag needs to generate.
Compromise and Recovery
In this attack, the adversary compromises some tags, obtains the polynomials assigned to these tags, and tries to recover the bivariate polynomials used in the server side. This is an intermediate step toward impersonation and tracing.
First we express the polynomial assignment in the form of a matrix computation. Let For the adversary to recover an M i , it is necessary to know Y i . Suppose the adversary obtains Y i . He then needs to solve the following system of n(k + 1) equations with n + (k + 1) 2 unknown variables:
where
A necessary (but maybe not sufficient) condition to solve (7) is n ≥
We assume that when n ≥
, the adversary can solve (7) in a practical time period τ . So by compromising n tags, the adversary does not know which n polynomials in the n tags are generated from the same M . We assume that the best he can do is to draw one polynomial from each tag as a row of Y i , and solve x 1 , . . . , x n and M i in (7). With probability 1/m n−1 , the polynomials in Y i are generated from the same bivariate polynomial f . Therefore, we estimate that the probability that the adversary can compute one M i in time τ is
Remark.After the adversary has compromised n tags, if he also knows the meta IDs x 1 , . . . , x n of the tags, then he can use the GS algorithm to recover M 1 , . . . , M m . However, when x 1 , . . . , x n are unknown, the GS algorithm is no longer applicable, and we assume that there is no efficient algorithm to solve the problem. It is worthwhile to further investigate the validity of this assumption.
Impersonation
In the impersonation attack, the adversary tries to impersonate a uncompromised tag to a reader. In the RFID literature, this is often named counterfeiting or cloning. Since cloning implies replicating a tag, we think that impersonation may describe the goal of the adversary better. For example, the adversary may combine the information gathered from a tag to generate new messages to impersonate a tag, or use the information gather from one tag to impersonate another tag. In both cases, the adversary tries to cheat the reader in a way other than by replicating. The impersonation attack model for RFID should be much weaker than that for conventional cryptographic entity authentication. For example, concurrent attacks (where the adversary concurrently executes multiple sessions with the prover (tag)) and intruder-in-the-middle attacks (where the adversary intercepts and manipulate the messages between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader)) do not seem to apply to RFID. These attacks originated in the Internet communication model and have not been considered for RFID in the literature. The main concern for RFID is that, in a authentication session, the adversary might be able to use the information collected before to make the reader accept it as a valid and uncompromised tag. This is similar to the smartcard communication model. We analyze the protocol in this scenario.
After receiving a challenge r, to make the reader accept it as a valid tag, the adversary A needs to generate a point (r , z ) such that z = g(h(r||r )) where g is a polynomial assigned to the tag. As we have analyzed, the adversary cannot learn the polynomials assigned to a tag by querying a tag or compromising other tags. Since A does not know g, he cannot compute z by evaluating g().
Then A may choose a z previously generated by the tag. A can do this in a probabilistic way: after observing a query and response from the tag, A randomly picks one point from the response. With probability 1/b, A gets r 0 , r 0 , and z 0 where z 0 = f (h(r 0 ||r 0 )). Then A needs to find r such that h(r||r ) = h(r 0 ||r 0 ). When r is a random challenge, and the hash function h() is modelled as a random oracle, then the probability that A chooses r such that h(r||r ) = h(r 0 ||r 0 ) is
A may just send random points and hope that at least one of them satisfies z = f (x , h(r||r )) for a polynomial f ∈ {f 1 , . . . , f m } and a valid meta ID x . The probability that this happens is similar to (1).
Tracing
Now we consider the tracing problem. Suppose that the adversary observes or participates in two authentication sessions as a reader. The problem for the adversary is to tell if the two sessions involve the same tag.
The output of a tag is b points. b − 1 of them are random points, and only one point (r , g(h(r||r ))) contains the information related to the tag. As we have analyzed, the adversary cannot learn the polynomials of an uncompromised tag. Without knowing g, only when y 1 = h(r||r 1 ) = y 2 = h(r||r 2 ), the adversary can tell that two points (y 1 , g(y 1 )) and (y 2 , g(y 2 )) are generated by the same polynomial. When r 1 and r 2 are generated by the tag at random, and the hash function h() is modelled as a random oracle, the probability that the adversary can trace a tag by its response is
Note that if a tag has been queried more than Q max times, and the adversary can get more information than the tag's response (i.e., if an authentic reader accepts the tag), then the adversary may trace the tag.
Performance
We discuss the performance of the protocol under a concrete parameter setting. We set l = 64, m = 16, k = 8, b = 8, and Q max = 13700.
Security and Privacy
The security and privacy provided by the protocol is as follows.
-The adversary queries a tag and tries to recover the secret polynomials held by the tag. In each trial, the probability that the adversary can succeed is at most 2 −60 (by (5)). -The adversary compromises several tags and tries to determine the secret bivariate polynomials held by the server. In each trial, the probability that the adversary can succeed is at most 2 −40 (by (8)). Note that, with probability 2 −40 , the adversary only obtains a correct system of nonlinear equations. The system consists of (k + 1) 2 + k + 3 unknowns and (k + 1) 2 + k + 3 equations. It is not clear whether there is any efficient algorithm to solve the system. -The adversary tries to compute a valid response using messages previously generated by a tag. In each trial, the probability that the adversary can succeed is 2 −63 (by (9)).
-The adversary answers a query with random responses. In each interaction with the reader, the probability that the adversary is identified as a valid tag is at most 2 −22 when N ≤ 2 32 (by (1)). -The adversary tries to determine if two responses are from the same tag.
For each pair of responses from one tag, the probability that the adversary succeeds is at most 2 −63 (by 10). -The adversary launches a Denial of Service (DOS) attack against a tag by repeatedly querying a tag. After being queried for 13700 times, a tag cannot be accepted by an authentic reader. In addition, an adversary may be able to trace the tag using information in addition to the tag's response, e.g., if the tag is accepted by an authentic reader.
Tag
In each session, a tag needs to generate 2b−1 random numbers in F 2 l , evaluate a polynomial of degree k over F 2 l , and compute a hash function. Random number generation and hash computation are considered suitable for symmetric-key tags and have been used in most previous RFID protocols. The tag needs to store m polynomials over F 2 l , each of degree k. So it needs to store m(k + 1) items of size l. For m = 16, k = 8, l = 64, it takes 9216 bit ROM, corresponding to 9216 gates in hardware. Using Horner's rule, it takes k modular multiplication over F 2 l to evaluate a polynomial of degree k. A 64 bit modular multiplier takes several hundred gates in hardware. Therefore, in our protocol, a tag needs about 10000 more gates in hardware than a regular tag capable of hashing computation. As a comparison, if pubic key techniques are used to solve the scalability problem while preserving privacy, then about 20000 gates are required to implement an ECC processor for RFID tags to perform public key computations [9] .
Server
The server stores m bivariate polynomials of degree k. This requires m(k + 1) 2 l/8 ≈ 10K bytes memory. In each session, for each bivariate polynomial f (x, y) and each received point (z , r ), the reader needs to solve an equation z = f (x, h(r||r )). Then it checks if the roots are valid meta IDs. There are efficient algorithms to solve polynomials over finite fileds, e.g., Berlekamp's algorithm [4] and the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [6] . After a meta ID is computed, it takes constant time to check if it is valid. Solving the polynomials dominates the total time in an authentication process.
We implemented the reader algorithm based on NTL [1] . On a P4 3.2G PC with 1G RAM running Linux, when m = 16, k = 8, b = 8, and l = 64, the running time using the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm in average case (solving mb/2 polynomials of degree k on F 2 l where l = 64) is about 0.1 seconds for one query.
Scalability
N (the maximum number of tags ) is at most l bits. N is also limited by the false positive probability given in (1) . Given the fixed parameters m = 16, k = 8, b = 8, and l = 64, when the false positive probability is less than 2 −22 , N can be as large as 2 32 , which is sufficient for almost all conceivable applications. Therefore the protocol is highly scalable.
Comparison
We compare our protocol with OSK/AO [3] . Both protocols are secure and untraceable, and both are designed to solve the key search problem to provide good scalability.
Time and Space.OSK/AO has a query threshold Q m , which is the length of its hash chain. OSK/AO needs to store a precomputed table of size M . The time for each query follows the rule
where µ is a constant. For N = 2 20 , Q m = 128, and M = 1GByte, OSK/AO takes 0.004 milliseconds for one query. However, when the number of tags increases, without increasing the table size, the time increases fast. Let M, Q m be fixed, and let T 1 , T 2 be the time for tag number N 1 , N 2 respectively. It holds that
If we consider a system of N = 2 32 tags, then, OSK/AO will take 67 seconds for one query, using an 1G bytes precomputed table. As a comparison, our protocol takes 0.1 seconds and 10K bytes memory in the server.
Query Threshold.In OSK/AO, if a tag is queried more than Q m = 128 times by an adversary between two queries by an authentic server, then the tag cannot be recognized by an authentic reader. In our protocol, if a tag is queried a total Q m = 13700 times, then it cannot be recognized by an authentic reader. In OSK/AO, the time for one query increases in Q m 3 (instead of Q m 2 ). In our protocol, the time increases in √ Q m . Therefore, the query threshold Q m in our protocol is much higher. However, OSK/AO does not have a limit on the total number of queries for a tag, although it is more susceptible to tag disable attacks where an adversary repeatedly queries a tag in a short time. On the contrary, our scheme is more resilient to tag disable attacks, but there is a limit on the total number of times that a tag can be queried. Which approach is better depends on how frequently a tag is queried. For example, in a library RFID system where a tag may be queried several times a day, the OSK/AO scheme may be desirable.
In some other applications such as e-passport where a tag is queried every several weeks or months, our protocol may be preferable.
Tag Hardware.The main drawback of our protocol compared to OSK/AO may be the hardware cost on the tag side, which is about 10000 more gates in hardware.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel RFID protocol to solve the key search problem in RFID identification protocols. In previous RFID protocols, a hash-chain is used to achieve good privacy. In such protocols, to identify a tag, a sever needs to search a table of size N Q, where N is the number of tags and Q is the length of the hash chain. The search takes either Θ(N Q) time or Θ(N Q) memory, and therefore it does not scale well. A time-memory tradeoff technique can mitigate the scalability problem. However, with the time-memory tradeoff, either the time or the space is still at least Θ((N Q) 2/3 ). In our protocol, the server "solves", instead of "searches", for a tag ID. The protocol is based on polynomial operation, and its security and privacy is based on the difficulty of reconstructing a polynomial with noisy data. The protocol supports very large N Q values. In our demo implementation where N = 2 32 , Q = 13700, the server takes 0.1 seconds and 10K bytes memory to identify a tag. As a comparison, a hash-chain protocol enhanced with time-memory tradeoff will take 67 seconds with the support of a 1G bytes pre-computed table. At the same time, our protocol preserves security and privacy.
A Discussion on NPI and Exhaustive Search and Deletion
We discuss the optimal choices of n and β for A to achieve Adv N P I S,B,k . It is difficult to give an analytic result, so here we discuss this question based on some simulations. Figure 1 shows P N P I (S, B, k, n, β) as a function of n and β for 1 ≤ n ≤ Bk + 1, 1 ≤ β ≤ B, B = 5 and k = 5. We see that when n approaches Bk + 1 and β approaches B, P N P I increases sharply to 1. That indicates that if there are enough sets of points (s ≥ Bk + 1), then the adversary can easily recover the polynomial. Figure 2 shows P N P I (S, B, k, n, β) as a function of n and β for 1 ≤ n ≤ S, 1 ≤ β ≤ B, B = 5, k = 5 and S = 83 ≤ Bk. There are two points that have peak values among their vicinities in the graph. One is at n = k + 2 and β = 1, the other is at n = 83 = S and β = 13.
We note that, if we use the exhaustive search approach, we will choose n = k + 1 and β = 1, and then we have is lower than the peak value where P N P I (S, B, k, k + 2, 1) = 0.8 × 10 −7 , but the difference is small in view of their magnitudes. Also, the point (n = k + 1, β = 1) for exhaustive search is close to that for the peak value at (n = k + 2, b = 1).
If we take the exhaustive deletion approach, then we will choose n = S = 83, β = S k − 1 = 16, and have P N P I (S, B, k, 83, 16) = 0.4 × 10 −8 which is lower than the other peak value P N P I (S, B, k, 83, 15) = 0.4 × 10 −7 , but difference is small in view of their magnitudes. Also the point for exhaustive search (n = 83, β = 16) is close to that for the peak value at (n = 83, β = 15).
The above observation leads to the conjecture that, for S < Bk+1, the results of exhaustive search and exhaustive deletion are close to the best strategy for the adversary. Then the advantage of the adversary may be estimated as 
B Discussion on Interrogation Threshold
For the protocol to be secure, we require that the advantage of the adversary is no more than a given . It is not clear how to directly compute Q max (or equivalently n max = Q max /m) for given . We give the following estimate. In Figure 1 , we see that P (S, B, k, n, k) = 1 when n = Bk + 1, and P (S, B, k, n, k) decreases sharply to 0 when n decreases. This implies that n max is less than Bk and may be close to Bk. Correspondingly, in the query-and-recovery attack, Table 1 . 
